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The Political Motivation 
FORUM 
THE POLITICAL MOTIVATION OF A m  210N DEREGULATION 
William Zink 
During the early stages of the US airline industry, there were no formal govement regulatory controls. "Prior to 1938, 
only airmail carriers had been subject to government regulation" (Lin 3). The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 laid the 
ground work for the federal regulatory policies of the airline industry which remained intact for nearly 4 decades. The 
main goal of this act was to "strengthen the air transport system in this country through tight regulation and restriction 
of new competitors""(Miller 4). 
The 1938 Act created defined order by allowing all 
established carriers to continue service on existing routes. 
Further proposals concenring all new routes and competitors 
had to be approved by the government. The authorization of 
new routes was abased on the mandate stating that proposals 
must show potential profitability, and that existing carriers 
would not be placed in economic jeopardy by the plan (Miller 
5). The act also classified airlines into categories which 
included: 'Ynmk, local service, commuter, supplemental, or 
all-cargo operators" (US Dept. of Commerce 5). Trunk 
airlines were composed of the largest carriers, while local 
service airlines acted as the feeders for the trunk carriers. 
Commuter airlines flew small aircraft and supplemental 
caniers acted as charter companies, while all-cargo operators 
flew t i q h t  Control and enforcement of the provisions of the 
Civil Aeronautics Act was delegated to the newly formed 
Civil Aeronautics Authority, '%la renamed the Civil 
Aeronautics Board" (Lin 3). 
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was given the great 
task to regulate an industry that had previously been fiee to 
operate without constraint. The CAB was granted specific 
authorities as established in the Civil Aeronautics Act which 
included: "control of entry, control of exit, fare regulation, 
subsidy approval, control of mergers and inter carrier 
agreements, d investigation of deceptive trade practices and 
unfair methods of competition" (Thomas 2). 
Control of entry and exit dealt with the establishment of new 
carriers and routes. Large@ focusing on entry of new 
competitors, the CAB protected existing carriers by crushing 
an endless number of new proposals. Those who were able to 
gain approval for new mutes were forced to go through a time 
consuming process of investigations headed by the CAB. In 
the later years of regulation, the CAB stopped approving new 
proposals altogether. An investigation of airline regulation in 
1975 found that "out of 94 applications for trunk carrier 
author@ received since 1 950, none and succeeded" (Mder3). 
Exisling caniers were not allowed to abondon routes without 
authorization from the board, however, some were forced to 
end service due to corporate instability. Since very few new 
entrant proposals had been granted, the number of existing 
carriers dwindled as mergers and exit out of the industry 
occurred. This severly limited US airline growth, which later 
became an important basis in the argument for deregulation. 
Other key areas of CAB authority focused on fares and 
subsidies. Fares for passengers were directly controlled by 
the CAB, and although airlines were able to request specific 
rates, the board had final authority. The "fare-level was based 
on hypothetical industry costs instead of actual cost 
experience" (Miller 5). This allowed fares to be unnaturally 
inflated, which cost the consumer heavlly. The CAB also 
controlled the payment of subsidies to airlines. The purpose 
of these payments was to provide service to many of the 
smaller communities in the US. The subsidies were given to 
the airlines in the form of contracts for carrying US mail 
(Miuer 0). 
The remaining authorities of the CAB, pertaining to inter- 
carrier agreements and airline trade practices, were secondary 
areas of focus. Merger and inter-carrier agreement control 
was largely manipulated by the board's policies of industry 
entry and exit. Certain mergers were ratified in order to save 
existing airlines that had become ktncially unstable. Mutual 
airline agreements, once approved by the board, "were 
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&cally given immunity fiom antitrust laws" (Miller 7). 
Investigation into deceptive trade practices and unfair 
methods of competition dealt primarily with false advertising 
and lack of airline adherence to regulated ticket prices. 
Airlines trying to bend these rules faced stiff penalties and in- 
depth CAB investigations. 
The goal of the Civil Aeronautics Board was to create strong 
national airlines, and undoubtedly it did. The airline industry 
was seen as an infant industry, as described by some 
economists, which needed protection fiom competition in 
order to develop and mature. The CAB and regulation did 
indeed serve their purpose, but in the late 1960's and early 
1970's the industry was becoming constrained by these 
protective government policies (Thomas 4). Consumers 
complained of in£lated ticket prices, and small airlines were 
eager to gain entry into this market. Noted economists also 
remarked similar views, and soon politicians took an interest 
in the issue of disbanding the CAB and pushing for airline 
deregulation. 
The political interest in deregulation found its basis in the 
Watergate investigations of the Nixon administration 
(Petzinger 78). Stephen Breyer, a lawyer on the Watergate 
Special Pmsi%utions force, discovered that American Airlines 
was one of the companies which had contributed funds to the 
Nixon admbktntioa Breyer realized that American Airlines 
must have been trying to influence someone in government 
who' was possibly connected to the CAB. He also noted the 
mtemting fact that Gerald Ford, the president at the time, was 
trying to decrease US innation yet "the airline industry was 
gouging the traveling public with higher and higher fares7' 
(Petzinger 80). 
During this period, Senator Edward Kennedy was looking 
to run for the presidency in the upcoming election. Kennedy 
realized that he would need an issue to base his campaign on. 
Breyer propositioned Kennedy with his discovery, and the 
senator decided to use this as his platform. The goal of the 
campaign was to establish a Senate inquiry to examine 
government control of the airline industry, champion 
cierernon, and elimination of the CAB. Knowing that this 
was going to be no easy task, Breyer enlisted the help of Phil 
Bakes an associate h n  college. Bakes was also a lawyer and 
part of the Watergate Prosecution force. 
The first obstacle on the path to deregulation was Senator 
Howard Cannon. Cannon had a vested interest in aviation 
because he was &om Nevada, a state which relies heavily 
upon airlines to transport vacationing travelers. He was also 
chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation, as well as 
the chairman of the Rules Committee which controls the 
budgets for all other Senate committees (Petzinger 81). 
Clearly Kennedy's inquiry had to be sensitive to the concerns 
of Senator Cannon. 
The seumd major obstacle encountered by Kennedy's team 
was the airlines. Nearly all of the trunk carriers opposed the 
notion of deregulation. The major concerns of the airlines 
were based on the intensive fear of competition and the drastic 
reduction in fares brought about by low cost entrants. The 
main impediment Kennedy faced relating to the airlines was 
lobbyists. The airline industry had developed one of the 
largest pools of lobbyist in government, who were very 
influential about de&ions affiting airline profitability. There 
was a glimpse of hope for Kennedy's efforts though. Dick 
Ferris, CEO of United Airlirres, believed that United could 
benelit from deregulation (Lin 6). Ferris felt that government 
regulation was restricting the growth of US airlines. He 
believed that deregulation was inevitable and the company 
should take the lead in promoting Senator Kennedy's ideas. 
Support for deregulation also came fiom within the CAB. 
"Alfred Kahn of Cornell argued that the policies of the CAB 
tended to raise cost to the level of price" (petzinger 82). This 
idea emphasized the inefficiency that government regulation 
had promoted. Monte Lazarus, a high ranking official within 
the CAB, saw this inefficiency and refused to take part in the 
government bureaucracy any longer. Lazarus decided to go to 
work for United as a consultant, hoping to aid in the 
deregulation process. 
At this point, the Subcommittee on A-ative Practice 
and Procedure began to review the findings which Kennedy's 
investigation had uncovered (petzinger 84). Many issues 
including inefficiency and illegal practices of the CAB were 
discussed. The fact that deregulation had already begun 
within the industry was brought to light. Airlines such as 
Texas International were taking advantage of the CAB's 
decreased control over f a  policies by introducing discounted 
fares. The subcommittee found particular interest in the 
akgat~ons of illegal practices of the CAB. It was discovered 
by Bakes, of Kennedy's team, that investigations into the 
CAB's umnection with the Watergate scandal were internally 
covered up by members of the agency. 
As the hearings progressed, Senator Kennedy's Democratic 
Presidential nomination was lost to Jimmy Carter. Carter, 
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later elected president, supported Kennedy's drive for airline 
deregulation. It was also during this period that United 
Airlines officially voiced its support of deregulation. Several 
other smaller airlines (Frontier and Southwest) joined 
United's stance regarding deregulation &Wer 27). 
The tide turned against government control when John 
Robson, then chairman of the CAB, testified before the Senate 
subcamittee in favor of deregulation. This important event 
changed the opinion of Senator Cannon, chairman of the 
subcommittee, regarding the importance of deregulation. 
Now the last hurdle for the Kennedy team had been 
conquered. To fiu-ther ensure victory in their effort, Phil 
Bakes got Alfred Kahn appointed chairman of the CAB as a 
replacement for Robson (Miller 28). Kahn acted as a puppet 
for the Kennedy team to manipulate, so as to ensure that the 
deregulation legislation would not be defeated. 
Bakes also used other clever techniques to convince 
q e s s i o n a l  supporters of government control to vote for the 
Airline Daegulation Act. The act passed through the Senate 
but was voted down in the House of Representatives. M e r  
Senator Kennedy used his political presence in fundraising 
events, as a favor to particular members of the House, the 
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was passed by both the 
House and Senate. 
The main goal of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was 
to increase competition within the airline industry. The act 
goes against most pf the principles outlined in the Civil 
Aeronautics Act of 1938. The 1978 act promotes the entrance 
of new carriers, as well as existing carriers into new areas. 
Other areas of focus included "continued support of sewice 
into small communities and the use of secondary airports as 
major metropolitan areas " (Miller 11). An emphasis on air 
safety had also been mandated in the act. 
After the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was passed, the 
power of the CAB quickly began to diminish, and drastic 
changes were made to its previously regulated authority. 
Major changes in authority affected policies regarding: 
control of entry, routes, fare control, modifications to subsidy 
programs, and antitrust legislation. These areas of control 
were gradually delegated to various governmental agencies, 
and the CAB lost all control when it ceased existence on 
January 1,1985. 
Protection of existing carriers was no longer the goal of the 
US government. Rules for entry into the airline industry 
became quite liberal after the Deregulation Act was passed. 
The liberalized role of government is also seen in the area of 
airline mute control. The new route structure allowed airlines 
to automatically enter into certain locations without going 
through a 1-y bureaucratic process. This greatly increased 
competition that could not be experienced under the 
umstmiuts of the CAB. In addition, deregulation now allowed 
airlines to set their own fares based on their competition, 
rather than an arbitrary level. Fares were allowed to vary 
according to passenger concentrations and the time of year. 
Other changes in authority involved subsidies and antitrust 
legislation. Subsidy regulation was drastically changed, and 
control over these payments was given to the Department of 
Transportation in 1985 (Miller 1 1). The 1978 act provided 
that once a carrier decided to withdraw from a subsidized 
route, the subsidy was terminated. This initially hurt smaller 
destination airports which benefited from the subsidy 
program, but commuter airlines quickly filled these vacant 
roles. Complete control of legislation concerning mergers and 
agreements was given to the Department of Justice in 1 ' 983. 
Antitrust issues have been a major concern in light of the 
recent merger proposals amongst the i n d w ' s  largest 
established carriers. 
The deregulation of the airline industry has restructured 
unporate business Megies. Today's airlines are much more 
efficient and cost conscious in every aspect of business 
activity. Competition demands that airlines utilize all 
available resources. New ideas and technologies are 
developed quickly in order for companies to gain competitive 
advantages over other firms. Advancements such as the use 
of computer reservation systems and online ticket auctions are 
pushing the industry to new limits. Under this free market 
system, the possibilities are limitless for the airline 
industry.0 
JAAER, Spring 1999 Page 2 1 
3
Zink: The Political Motivation of Aviation Deregulation
Published by Scholarly Commons, 1999
The Political Motivation 
From time to lime those of us in aviation education receive excellent papers from our students through the routine of our classes. 
Some of these are worthy of publication. Such is the case of this paper. Its author, William J. Z& an undergraduate (!) student 
submitted it as a requirement for a class in aviation legislation. 
The editorial board of this journal encourages aviation educators in both graduate and undergraduate aviation programs across the 
county to submit deserving papers fiom their students for review and potential publication. 
T. Brady, Dean of the School of Aviation, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
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